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1 ACT
ACT n ( abrév = American College Test) US examen d'admission à l'universitéACT Examen dans quatre disciplines fondamentales ( English, Mathematics, Reading, Science reasoning) que les élèves américains passent à la fin de leurs études secondaires. Il est reconnu par la plupart des universités, qui en tiennent compte dans leurs critères d'admission. ⇒ college -
2 Artificial Intelligence
In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, EventuallyJust as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the ProgramMany problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)[AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract FormThe basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory FormationIt is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular ContextsEven if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial IntelligenceThe primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary PropositionsIn artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
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3 Bibliography
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C. (1973). Identification of conceptualizations underlying natural language. In R. C. Schank & K. M. Colby (Eds.), Computer models of thought and language (pp. 187-248). San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Schank, R. C. (1976). The role of memory in language processing. In C. N. Cofer (Ed.), The structure of human memory. (pp. 162-189) San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.■ Schank, R. C. (1986). Explanation patterns: Understanding mechanically and creatively. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Schank, R. C., & R. P. Abelson (1977). Scripts, plans, goals, and understanding. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ SchroЁdinger, E. (1951). Science and humanism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Searle, J. R. (1981a). Minds, brains, and programs. In J. Haugeland (Ed.), Mind design: Philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (pp. 282-306). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Searle, J. R. (1981b). Minds, brains and programs. In D. Hofstadter & D. Dennett (Eds.), The mind's I (pp. 353-373). New York: Basic Books.■ Searle, J. R. (1983). Intentionality. New York: Cambridge University Press.■ Serres, M. (1982). The origin of language: Biology, information theory, and thermodynamics. M. Anderson (Trans.). In J. V. Harari & D. F. Bell (Eds.), Hermes: Literature, science, philosophy (pp. 71-83). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.■ Simon, H. A. (1966). Scientific discovery and the psychology of problem solving. In R. G. Colodny (Ed.), Mind and cosmos: Essays in contemporary science and philosophy (pp. 22-40). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.■ Simon, H. A. (1979). Models of thought. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.■ Simon, H. A. (1989). The scientist as a problem solver. In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert Simon. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Simon, H. A., & C. Kaplan (1989). Foundations of cognitive science. In M. 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The principles of psychology. New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts.■ Steiner, G. (1975). After Babel: Aspects of language and translation. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Sternberg, R. J. (1977). Intelligence, information processing, and analogical reasoning. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.■ Sternberg, R. J. (1994). Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, Thinking and problem solving. San Diego: Academic Press.■ Sternberg, R. J., & J. E. Davidson (1985). Cognitive development in gifted and talented. In F. D. Horowitz & M. O'Brien (Eds.), The gifted and talented (pp. 103-135). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.■ Storr, A. (1993). The dynamics of creation. New York: Ballantine Books. (Originally published in 1972.)■ Stumpf, S. E. (1994). Philosophy: History and problems (5th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.■ Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel: Birth order, family dynamics, and creative lives. New York: Random House/Vintage Books.■ Thorndike, E. L. (1906). Principles of teaching. New York: A. G. Seiler.■ Thorndike, E. L. (1970). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. Darien, CT: Hafner Publishing Co. (Originally published in 1911.)■ Titchener, E. B. (1910). A textbook of psychology. New York: Macmillan.■ Titchener, E. B. (1914). A primer of psychology. New York: Macmillan.■ Toulmin, S. (1957). The philosophy of science. London: Hutchinson.■ Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organisation of memory. London: Academic Press.■ Turing, A. (1946). In B. E. Carpenter & R. W. Doran (Eds.), ACE reports of 1946 and other papers. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.■ Turkle, S. (1984). Computers and the second self: Computers and the human spirit. New York: Simon & Schuster.■ Tyler, S. A. (1978). The said and the unsaid: Mind, meaning, and culture. New York: Academic Press.■ van Heijenoort (Ed.) (1967). From Frege to Goedel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.■ Varela, F. J. (1984). The creative circle: Sketches on the natural history of circularity. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality (pp. 309-324). New York: W. W. Norton.■ Voltaire (1961). On the Penseґs of M. Pascal. In Philosophical letters (pp. 119-146). E. Dilworth (Trans.). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.■ Wagman, M. (1991a). Artificial intelligence and human cognition: A theoretical inter comparison of two realms of intellect. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1991b). Cognitive science and concepts of mind: Toward a general theory of human and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1993). Cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence: Theory and re search in cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1995). The sciences of cognition: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1996). Human intellect and cognitive science: Toward a general unified theory of intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997a). Cognitive science and the symbolic operations of human and artificial intelligence: Theory and research into the intellective processes. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1997b). The general unified theory of intelligence: Central conceptions and specific application to domains of cognitive science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998a). Cognitive science and the mind- body problem: From philosophy to psychology to artificial intelligence to imaging of the brain. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998b). Language and thought in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology, artificial intelligence, and neural science. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1998c). The ultimate objectives of artificial intelligence: Theoretical and research foundations, philosophical and psychological implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (1999). The human mind according to artificial intelligence: Theory, re search, and implications. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wagman, M. (2000). Scientific discovery processes in humans and computers: Theory and research in psychology and artificial intelligence. Westport, CT: Praeger.■ Wall, R. (1972). Introduction to mathematical linguistics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.■ Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.■ Wason, P. (1977). Self contradictions. In P. Johnson-Laird & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.■ Wason, P. C., & P. N. Johnson-Laird. (1972). Psychology of reasoning: Structure and content. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.■ Watson, J. (1930). Behaviorism. New York: W. W. Norton.■ Watzlawick, P. (1984). Epilogue. In P. Watzlawick (Ed.), The invented reality. New York: W. W. Norton, 1984.■ Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes: A modern view of the origin of the uni verse. New York: Basic Books.■ Weisberg, R. W. (1986). Creativity: Genius and other myths. 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The psychology of computer vision. New York: McGrawHill.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.■ Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The blue and brown books. New York: Harper Colophon.■ Woods, W. A. (1975). What's in a link: Foundations for semantic networks. In D. G. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representations and understanding: Studies in cognitive science (pp. 35-84). New York: Academic Press.■ Woodworth, R. S. (1938). Experimental psychology. New York: Holt; London: Methuen (1939).■ Wundt, W. (1904). Principles of physiological psychology (Vol. 1). E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Wundt, W. (1907). Lectures on human and animal psychology. J. E. Creighton & E. B. Titchener (Trans.). New York: Macmillan.■ Young, J. Z. (1978). Programs of the brain. New York: Oxford University Press.■ Ziman, J. (1978). Reliable knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
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4 तर्कः _tarkḥ
तर्कः (तर्क्-भावे अच्)1 Supposition, conjecture, guess; प्रसन्नस्ते तर्कः V.2.-2 Reasoning, speculation, discu- ssion, abstract reasoning; कुतः पुनरस्मिन्नवधारिते आगमार्थे तर्कनिमित्तस्याक्षेपस्यावकाशः; इदानीं तर्कनिमित्त आक्षेपः परिह्रियते Ś. B.; तर्को$प्रतिष्ठः स्मृतयो विभिन्नाः Mb.; Ms.12.16.-3 Doubt.-4 Logic, the science of logic; यत्काव्यं मधुवर्षि धर्षितपरास्तर्केषु यस्योक्तयः N.22.155; तर्कशास्त्रम्, तर्कदीपिका-5 (In logic) Reduction to absurdity, a conclusion opposed to the premises, a reductio ad absurdum.-6 A system of doctrine founded on pure reasoning or free thinking, a philosophical system (particularly one of the six principal Darṣanas q. v.).-7 A name for the number 'six'.-8 Supplying an ellipsis.-9 Cause, motive.-1 Wish, desire.-र्का Speculation, reasoning.-Comp. -अटः a beggar.-आभासः fallacious reasoning, fallacy in drawing conclusions.-कौमुदी N. of a Vaiśeṣika-work.-मुद्रा a particular position of the hand; कृत्वोरौ दक्षिणे सव्यं पादपद्मं च जानुनि । बाहुप्रकोष्ठे$क्षमालामासीनं तर्कमुद्रया ॥ Bhāg.4. 6.38.-विद्या logic; philosophical treatise.-शास्त्रम् 1 logic.-2 a philosophical work. -
5 filosofía
f.philosophy, ideology.* * *1 philosophy\tomarse algo con filosofía to take something philosophically* * *noun f.* * *SF philosophyfacultad 3)* * *femenino philosophytómate las cosas con filosofía — (fam) you have to be philosophical about things
* * *= philosophy, philosophy.Ex. For example, class R philosophy is first divided into such canonical divisions as Logic, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics and Aesthetics.Ex. Let us attempt to examine first the thinking and philosophy behind the arrangement of libraries designed in this period.----* filosofía de la ciencia = philosophy of science.* filosofía de vida = philosophy of life.* filosofía educativa = educational philosophy.* filosofía y letras = arts and humanities, the, arts and letters.* la filosofía de = the reason behind, the reasoning behind.* seguir una filosofía = espouse + philosophy.* * *femenino philosophytómate las cosas con filosofía — (fam) you have to be philosophical about things
* * *= philosophy, philosophy.Ex: For example, class R philosophy is first divided into such canonical divisions as Logic, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Ethics and Aesthetics.
Ex: Let us attempt to examine first the thinking and philosophy behind the arrangement of libraries designed in this period.* filosofía de la ciencia = philosophy of science.* filosofía de vida = philosophy of life.* filosofía educativa = educational philosophy.* filosofía y letras = arts and humanities, the, arts and letters.* la filosofía de = the reason behind, the reasoning behind.* seguir una filosofía = espouse + philosophy.* * *1 (sistema, doctrina) philosophy2 (enfoque) philosophytiene una filosofía de la vida muy personal she has her own very personal outlook on life o philosophytómate las cosas con filosofía ( fam); you have to be philosophical about things* * *
filosofía sustantivo femenino
philosophy
filosofía sustantivo femenino
1 philosophy
2 familiar con filosofía, (con paciencia) philosophically, calmly
' filosofía' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
puesta
- puesto
- salida
- calar
- facultad
- licenciado
English:
body
- MA
- MPhil
- PhD
- philosophy
- bachelor
- philosophic
* * *filosofía nf1. [estudio] philosophyfilosofía del lenguaje philosophy of language;Filosofía y Letras humanities;filosofía moral moral philosophy;filosofía natural natural philosophy2. [ideas] philosophy;no entiendo la filosofía de estos cambios I don't understand the thinking behind these changes;tiene una filosofía del trabajo muy distinta a la mía she has a very different attitude to work to me* * *f philosophy* * *filosofía nf: philosophy* * *filosofía n philosophy -
6 علم
عِلْم \ knowledge: what one knows: His knowledge of radio is very wide. His general knowledge is slight. learning: knowledge that is gained by long serious study: He is a man of great learning. scholarship: the qualities of a very learned person: This writer on Shakespeare is famous for his scholarship. science: the careful study of any serious subject: political science; the science of language. \ بِغَير عِلْمِه \ behind sb.’s back: when someone is not present: He tells untrue stories about me behind my back. \ عِلْم الآثار القَديمة \ archaeology, archeology: the scientific study of life in the distant past by digging up ancient cities, examining buried objects, etc. \ عِلْم الاجْتِماع \ sociology: the study of society and human behaviour in groups. \ عِلْم الإِحْصَاء \ statistics: (with pl. verb) facts that are shown by numbers; (with sg. verb) the science of showing facts by numbers: National statistics of births and deaths are collected regularly. Statistics is a modern science. \ عِلْم الأَحْياء \ biology: the science of living things. \ عِلْم الأخلاق \ ethics: the study of good and bad in human behaviour. \ عِلْم الأرصاد الجوّيّة \ meteorology: the science of the weather. \ عِلْم الأساطير \ mythology: myths in general; the study of myths. \ عِلْم الاشْتِقاق (في علم اللُّغَة) \ etymology: the study of the history of words. \ عِلْم الأصوات \ phonetics: (as subject of study; pl. as a practical activity) the science of speech sounds; the signs used for these sounds; the practical use of this science: Phonetics is a modern science. Are these phonetics correct? Phonetics help foreigners to pronounce words. \ عِلْم الاقتصاد \ economics: the science of national economy. \ عِلْم الإنْسَان \ anthropology: the scientific study of man, his way of life, religions, races, etc. \ عِلْم بالوُصُول \ acknowledg(e)ment: a note of receipt: I sent the money but I’ve had no acknowledgement. \ عِلْم التاريخ \ history: an orderly record or study of past events: a student of history; the history of Europe. \ عِلْم التَّحْليل النَّفْسي \ psychoanalysis: (the scientific study of) a way of treating disorders ot the mind by examination of all that sb. can remember of his past life, dreams, feelings, etc.. \ عِلْم التَّدْبِير المنزليّ \ domestic science: the study of cooking and other housekeeping skills. \ عِلْم التَّنْجيم \ astrology: the study of the stars in relation to human fate. \ عِلْم الجَبْر \ algebra: a branch of mathematics, using signs and letters as well as numbers. \ عِلْم الجُغْرافيا \ geography: the scientific study of the structure, produce and use of the earth’s surface. \ عِلْم الحَرْب \ warfare: the science of making war; fighting. \ عِلْم حَرَكة السوائل \ hydraulics: the science of controlling and using liquid pressure, esp. for engineering purposes. \ عِلْم الحَشَرات \ entomology: the study of insects. \ عِلْم الحَيَوان \ zoology: the scientific study of animal life. \ عِلْم الرِّياضيّات \ mathematics: the science of numbers and space; the practical use of this science: Mathematics is an exact science. maths: the usual shortening of mathematics. \ عِلْم الزراعة بدون تُربة \ hydroponics: the science of growing plants in water, without soil. \ عِلْم السِّيَاسَة \ politics: (sg. as an art or activity; pl. as personal beliefs, etc.) the art of government; the affairs of government; one’s opinions on government: Is politics an art or a science? My politics are my private concern. \ عِلْم الصحّة \ hygiene: the study and practice of how to keep good health, esp. by paying attention to cleaniness. \ عِلْم صيانة الأحراش \ forestry: the science of growing trees for man’s use as wood. \ عِلْم الطّبّ \ medicine: the science and the art of dealing with disease. \ عِلْم طَبَقات الأرض \ geology: the study of the rocks that make up the earth. \ عِلْم الطبيعة \ physics: the science of heat, light, sound, Motion, etc.: Physics is an important branch of science. \ See Also الفيزياء \ عِلْم طبيعيّ \ science: the study of the substances, forces, etc. found in nature (esp. Biology; Chemistry; Physics): Schools teach science. \ عِلْم الطُّيُور \ ornithology: the scientific study of birds. \ عِلْم الفَلَك \ astronomy: the scientific study of the stars. \ عِلْم الكِيمْياء \ chemistry: the science that studies the nature and behaviour of all substances. \ عِلْم المالية \ finance: the science of controlling money. \ See Also إدارة المال \ عِلْم المَنْطِق \ logic: the science of reasoning. \ عِلْم النَّبَات \ botany: the scientific study of plants. \ عِلْم النَّفْس \ psychology: the scientific study of the mind. \ عِلْم الهَنْدَسة \ geometry: the science of lines, angles, surfaces and solid figures, and of their measurements. -
7 ratiō
ratiō ōnis, f [RA-], a reckoning, numbering, casting up, account, calculation, computation: ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum: quibus in tabulis ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset, etc., Cs.: auri ratio constat, the account tallies: rationem argenti ducere, reckoning: pecuniae habere rationem, to take an account: ratione initā, on casting up the account, Cs.: mihimet ineunda ratio est: (pecuniam) in rationem inducere, bring into their accounts: aeraria, the rate of exchange (the value of money of one standard in that of another): rationes ad aerarium continuo detuli, rendered accounts: rationes cum publicanis putare: rationes a colono accepit: longis rationibus assem in partīs diducere, calculations, H.— A list, manifest, protocol, report, statement: cedo rationem carceris, quae diligentissime conficitur.— A transaction, business, matter, affair, concern, circumstance: re ac ratione cum aliquo coniunctus: in publicis privatisque rationibus, Cs.: nummaria: popularis: comitiorum: ad omnem rationem humanitatis: meam.—Plur., with pron poss., account, interest, advantage: alquis in meis rationibus tibi adiungendus: alienum suis rationibus existimans, etc., inconsistent with his interests, S.—Fig., a reckoning, account, settlement, computation, explanation: rationem reddere earum rerum: secum has rationes putare, T.: initā subductāque ratione scelera meditantes, i. e. after full deliberation: quod posteaquam iste cognovit, hanc rationem habere coepit, reflection: totius rei consilium his rationibus explicabat, ut si, etc., upon the following calculation, Cs.: ut habere rationem possis, quo loco me convenias, etc., i. e. means of determining: semper ita vivamus, ut rationem reddendam nobis arbitremur, must account to ourselves: si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent, will hold you responsible, Cs.— Relation, reference, respect, connection, community: (agricolae) habent rationem cum terrā, quae, etc., have to do: cum omnibus Musis rationem habere: omnes, quibuscum ratio huic est.— A respect, regard, concern, consideration, care: utriusque (sc. naturae et fortunae) omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae: (deos) piorum et impiorum habere rationem: sauciorum et aegrorum habitā ratione, Cs.: propter rationem brevitatis, out of regard for: habeo rationem, quid a populo R. acceperim, consider: neque illud rationis habuisti, provinciam ad summam stultitiam venisse? did you not consider?—Course, conduct, procedure, mode, manner, method, fashion, plan, principle: tua ratio est, ut... mea, ut, etc.: defensionis ratio viaque: itaque in praesentiā Pompei sequendi rationem omittit, Cs.: in philosophiā disserendi: ut, quo primum curreretur, vix ratio iniri possit, Cs.: hoc aditu laudis vitae meae rationes prohibuerunt, plan of life.—Arrangement, relation, condition, kind, fashion, way, manner, style: ratio atque usus belli, the art and practice of war, Cs.: novae bellandi rationes, Cs.: quorum operum haec erat ratio, etc., Cs.: rationem pontis hanc instituit; tigna bina, etc., Cs.: iuris: haec eadem ratio est in summā totius Galliae, Cs.: eādem ratione, quā pridie, ab nostris resistitur, Cs: quid refert, quā me ratione cogatis?: nullā ratione, Cs.: tota ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est, principle.—The faculty of computing, judgment, understanding, reason, reasoning, reflection: Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet: homo, quod rationis est particeps, causas rerum videt: lex est ratio summa: ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret: si ratio et prudentia curas aufert, H.: mulier abundat audaciā, consilio et ratione deficitur: Arma amens capio, nec sat rationis in armis, V.: ratione fecisti, sensibly.—Ground, motive, reason: quid tandem habuit argumenti aut rationis res, quam ob rem, etc.: nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus: noverit orator argumentorum et rationum locos: ad eam sententiam haec ratio eos deduxit, quod, etc., Cs.: rationibus conquisitis de voluptate disputandum putant: Num parva causa aut prava ratiost? reason, excuse, T.— Reasonableness, reason, propriety, law, rule, order: omnia, quae ratione docentur et viā, reasonably and regularly: ut ratione et viā procedat oratio: quae res ratione modoque Tractari non volt, H.: intervallis pro ratā parte ratione distinctis, divided proportionally by rule: vincit ipsa rerum p. natura saepe rationem, system.—A theory, doctrine, system, science: haec nova et ignota ratio, solem lunae oppositum solere deficere: Epicuri, doctrine: Stoicorum: ratio vivendi... ratio civilis, the art of living... statesmanship.—Knowledge, science. si qua (est in me) huiusce rei ratio aliqua.— A view, opinion, conviction: Mea sic est ratio, T.: cum in eam rationem pro suo quisque sensu loqueretur: cuius ratio etsi non valuit, N.* * *I IIaccount, reckoning; plan; prudence; method; reasoning; rule; regard -
8 Philosophy
And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive ScienceIn the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)10) The Distinction between Dionysian Man and Apollonian Man, between Art and Creativity and Reason and Self- ControlIn his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy
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9 Experience
Any kind of experience-accidental impressions, observations, and even "inner experience" not induced by stimuli received from the environment-may initiate cognitive processes leading to changes in a person's knowledge. Thus, new knowledge can be acquired without new information being received. (That this statement refers to subjective knowledge goes without saying; but there is no such thing as objective knowledge that was not previously somebody's subjective knowledge. (Machlup & Mansfield, 1983, p. 644)Our faith in experience is far from well grounded, because we have an untenable concept of the nature of experience, one that assumes truth is manifest, and does not have to be inferred. (Brehmer, 1986, p. 715)I now wish to unfold the principles of experimental science, since without experience nothing can be sufficiently known. For there are two modes of acquiring knowledge, namely by reasoning and experience. Reasoning draws a conclusion and makes us grant the conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it remove doubt so that the mind may rest on the intuition of truth, unless the mind discovers it by the path of experience.... Aristotle's statement then that proof is reasoning that causes us to know is to be understood with the proviso that the proof is accompanied by its appropriate experience, and is not to be understood of the bare proof.... He therefore who wishes to rejoice without doubt in regard to the truths underlying phenomena must know how to devote himself to experiment. (Bacon, 1928, Pt. VI, Chap. 1)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Experience
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10 Knowledge
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and, in a word, all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects but things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived? (Berkeley, 1996, Pt. I, No. 4, p. 25)It seems to me that the only objects of the abstract sciences or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances.But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration. (Hume, 1975, Sec. 12, Pt. 3, pp. 163-165)Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (the ability to receive impressions), the second is the power to know an object through these representations (spontaneity in the production of concepts).Through the first, an object is given to us; through the second, the object is thought in relation to that representation.... Intuition and concepts constitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or empirical.... Pure intuitions or pure concepts are possible only a priori; empirical intuitions and empirical concepts only a posteriori. If the receptivity of our mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any way affected, is to be called "sensibility," then the mind's power of producing representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should be called "understanding." Our nature is so constituted that our intuitions can never be other than sensible; that is, it contains only the mode in which we are affected by objects. The faculty, on the other hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding.... Without sensibility, no object would be given to us; without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise. (Kant, 1933, Sec. 1, Pt. 2, B74-75 [p. 92])Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of Reason is real, but it is also, in itself, dialectical and deceptive.... Hence to attempt to draw our principles from it, and in their employment to follow this natural but none the less fallacious illusion can never produce science, but only an empty dialectical art, in which one school may indeed outdo the other, but none can ever attain a justifiable and lasting success. In order that, as a science, it may lay claim not merely to deceptive persuasion, but to insight and conviction, a Critique of Reason must exhibit in a complete system the whole stock of conceptions a priori, arranged according to their different sources-the Sensibility, the understanding, and the Reason; it must present a complete table of these conceptions, together with their analysis and all that can be deduced from them, but more especially the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori by means of their deduction, the principles of its use, and finally, its boundaries....This much is certain: he who has once tried criticism will be sickened for ever of all the dogmatic trash he was compelled to content himself with before, because his Reason, requiring something, could find nothing better for its occupation. Criticism stands to the ordinary school metaphysics exactly in the same relation as chemistry to alchemy, or as astron omy to fortune-telling astrology. I guarantee that no one who has comprehended and thought out the conclusions of criticism, even in these Prolegomena, will ever return to the old sophistical pseudo-science. He will rather look forward with a kind of pleasure to a metaphysics, certainly now within his power, which requires no more preparatory discoveries, and which alone can procure for reason permanent satisfaction. (Kant, 1891, pp. 115-116)Knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system. Further, a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, it is yet none the less false, just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle. It is for that reason easily refuted. The refutation consists in bringing out its defective character; and it is defective because it is merely the universal, merely a principle, the beginning. If the refutation is complete and thorough, it is derived and developed from the nature of the principle itself, and not accomplished by bringing in from elsewhere other counter-assurances and chance fancies. It would be strictly the development of the principle, and thus the completion of its deficiency, were it not that it misunderstands its own purport by taking account solely of the negative aspect of what it seeks to do, and is not conscious of the positive character of its process and result. The really positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much the very reverse: it is a negative attitude towards the principle we start from. Negative, that is to say, in its one-sided form, which consists in being primarily immediate, a mere purpose. It may therefore be regarded as a refutation of what constitutes the basis of the system; but more correctly it should be looked at as a demonstration that the basis or principle of the system is in point of fact merely its beginning. (Hegel, 1910, pp. 21-22)Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering. (Lewis, 1946, p. 1)"Evolutionary epistemology" is a branch of scholarship that applies the evolutionary perspective to an understanding of how knowledge develops. Knowledge always involves getting information. The most primitive way of acquiring it is through the sense of touch: amoebas and other simple organisms know what happens around them only if they can feel it with their "skins." The knowledge such an organism can have is strictly about what is in its immediate vicinity. After a huge jump in evolution, organisms learned to find out what was going on at a distance from them, without having to actually feel the environment. This jump involved the development of sense organs for processing information that was farther away. For a long time, the most important sources of knowledge were the nose, the eyes, and the ears. The next big advance occurred when organisms developed memory. Now information no longer needed to be present at all, and the animal could recall events and outcomes that happened in the past. Each one of these steps in the evolution of knowledge added important survival advantages to the species that was equipped to use it.Then, with the appearance in evolution of humans, an entirely new way of acquiring information developed. Up to this point, the processing of information was entirely intrasomatic.... But when speech appeared (and even more powerfully with the invention of writing), information processing became extrasomatic. After that point knowledge did not have to be stored in the genes, or in the memory traces of the brain; it could be passed on from one person to another through words, or it could be written down and stored on a permanent substance like stone, paper, or silicon chips-in any case, outside the fragile and impermanent nervous system. (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, pp. 56-57)Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Knowledge
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11 हेतुः _hētuḥ
हेतुः [हि-तुन् Uṇ.1.73]1 Cause, reason, object, mo- tive; इति हेतुस्तदुद्भवे K. P.1; Māl.1.23; R.1.1; नीचैराख्यं गिरिमधिवसेस्तत्र विश्रामहेतोः Me.25; Ś.3.12.-2 Source, origin; स पिता पितरस्तासां केवलं जन्महेतवः R.1.24 'authors of their being'.-3 A means or instrument.-4 The logical reason, the reason for an inference, middle term (forming the second member of the five- membered syllogism).-5 Logic, science of reasoning.-6 Any logical proof or argument.-7 A rhetorical reason (regarded by some writers as a figure of speech); it is thus defined:-- हेताहतुमता सार्धमभेदो हेतुरुच्यते.-8 (In gram.) The agent of the causal verb; P.I.4.55.-9 (with Buddhists) Primary cause.-1 (with Pāśu- patas) The external world and senses (that cause the bondage of the soul).-11 Mode, manner.-12 Condi- tion.-13 Price, cost; दीन्नाराणां दशशती पञ्चाशदधिकाभवत् । धान्यखारीक्रये हेतुर्देशे दुर्भिक्षविक्षते Rāj. T.5.71. (N. B. The forms हेतुना, हेतोः, rarely हेतौ, are used adverbially in the sense of 'by reason of', 'on account of', 'because of', with gen. or in comp.; तमसा बहुरूपेण वेष्टिताः कर्महेतुना Ms. 1.49; शास्त्रविज्ञानहेतुना; अल्पस्य हेतोर्बहु हातुमिच्छन् R.2.47; विस्मृतं कस्य हेतोः Mu.1.1. &c.).-Comp. -अपदेशः ad- ducing the hetu (in the form of the five-membered syl- logism).-अवधारणम् (in dram.) reasoning.-आक्षेप (in Rhet.) an objection accompanied with reasons; न स्तूयसे नरेन्द्र त्वं ददासीति कदाचन । स्वमेव मत्वा गृह्णन्ति यतस्त्वद्धन- मर्थिनः ॥ इत्येवमादिराक्षेपो हेत्वाक्षेप इति स्मृतः । Kāv.2.167-168.-आभासः 'the semblance of a reason', a fallacious middle term, fallacy; (it is of five kinds:-- सव्यभिचार or अनैकान्तिक, विरुद्ध, असिद्ध, सत्प्रतिपक्ष and बाधित).-उत्प्रेक्षा, -उपमा a simile accompanied with reasons.-उपक्षेपः, -उपन्यासः adducing a reason, statement of an argu- ment.-कर्तृ m. the causal subject; याजयेदिति हेतुकर्तु रेवैतत् प्रत्यक्षं वचनम्, लक्षणया यजेः कर्तुः ŚB. on MS.1.8.39.-दुष्ट a. unreasonable.-दृष्टिः scepticism.-बलिक a. strong in argument.-युक्त a. well-founded.-रूपकम् a meta- phor accompanied with reasons.-वादः 1 disputation, controversy.-2 fraud (कपट); न हेतुवादाल्लोभाद्वा धर्मं जह्यां कथंचन Mb.5.91.24.-3 assigning a cause (sceptically); न यक्ष्यन्ति न होष्यन्ति हेतुवादविमोहिताः Mb.3.19.26.-वादिन् 1 a disputant.-2 a sceptic.-विशेषोक्तिः a mention of difference accompanied with reasons; एकचक्रो रथो यन्ता विकलो विषमा हयाः । आक्रामत्येव तेजस्वी तथाप्यर्को नभस्तलम् ॥ सैषा हेतुविशेषोक्तिस्तेजस्वीति विशेषणात् ॥ Kāv.2.328-329.-शास्त्रम् a logically-treated work, any beretical work questioning the authority of Smṛitis or revelation; यो$वमन्येत ते मूले हेतुशास्त्राश्रयाद् द्विजः Ms.2.11.-हेतुमत् m. du. cause and effect. ˚भावः the relation existing between cause and effect. -
12 ratio
rătĭo, onis (abl. rationi, Lucr. 6, 66), f. [reor, ratus], a reckoning, account, calculation, computation.I.Lit.(α).Sing.: Les. Nequaquam argenti ratio conparet tamen. Sta. Ratio quidem hercle adparet: argentum oichetai, Plaut. Trin. 2, 4, 15 sq.:(β).rationem putare... bene ratio accepti atque expensi inter nos convenit,
id. Most. 1, 3, 141; 146; cf.: ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum, Cic. Lael. 16, 58:itur, putatur ratio cum argentario... Ubi disputata est ratio cum argentario,
Plaut. Aul. 3, 5, 53 sq.:dextera digitis rationem computat,
id. Mil. 2, 2, 49:magna ratio C. Verruci,
Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 77, § 188:direptio ejus pecuniae, cujus ratio in aede Opis confecta est,
id. Phil. 5, 6, 16; cf.:quibus in tabulis nominatim, ratio confecta erat, qui numerus domo exisset, etc.,... Quarum omnium rerum summa erat, etc.,
Caes. B. G. 1, 29: auri ratio constat: aurum in aerario est, the account agrees, i. e. is correct, Cic. Fl. 28, 69 (v. consto):decumo post mense, ut rationem te dictare intellego,
to make the reckoning, Plaut. Am. 2, 2, 38 (al. ductare):rationem ducere,
to make a computation, to compute, calculate, reckon, Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 52, § 129; so, rationem habere, to take an account, make a computation:omnium proeliorum,
Caes. B. C. 3, 53; cf.:hujus omnis pecuniae conjunctim ratio habetur,
id. B. G. 6, 19; and:piratarum,
Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 28, § 71:rationem inire,
to cast up, reckon, calculate, Caes. B. G. 7, 71, 4:quattuor minae periere, ut ratio redditur,
Plaut. Men. 1, 3, 23; cf.:tibi ego rationem reddam?
id. Aul. 1, 1, 6; id. Trin. 2, 4, 114:rationem referre,
Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 39, § 98:rationem repetere de pecuniis repetundis,
id. Clu. 37, 104: Py. Quanta istaec hominum summa est? Ar. Septem millia. Py. Tantum esse oportet:recte rationem tenes,
Plaut. Mil. 1, 1, 47 et saep.:drachumae, quas de ratione debuisti,
according to the account, id. Trin. 2, 4, 24:grandem (pecuniam) quemadmodum in rationem inducerent, non videbant,
how they should bring it into their accounts, Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 41, § 106.—Plur.: rationes putare argentariam, frumentariam, pabuli causa quae parata sunt;B.rationem vinariam, oleariam, quid venierit, etc.,
Cato, R. R. 2, 5:rationes ad aerarium continuo detuli... quas rationes si cognoris, intelleges, etc.,
Cic. Pis. 25, 61:ut rationes cum publicanis putarent,
id. Att. 4, 11, 1:rationes a colono accepit,
id. Caecin. 32, 94:quid opus est? inquam. Rationes conferatis. Assidunt, subducunt, ad nummum convenit,
id. Att. 5, 21, 12:rationes referre... rationes deferre,
id. Fam. 5, 20, 2:Romani pueri longis rationibus assem Discunt in partes centum diducere,
Hor. A. P. 325 et saep.:A RATIONIBVS,
an accountant, Inscr. Orell. 1494; 2973; 2986; 4173 et saep. (cf. ab).—Transf.1.A list, roll, register (rare):2.cedo rationem carceris, quae diligentissime conficitur, quo quisque die datus in custodiam, quo mortuus, quo necatus sit,
Cic. Verr. 2, 5, 57, § 147:rationes imperii, ab Augusto proponi solitas, sed a Tiberio intermissas, publicavit (sc. Caligula),
Suet. Calig. 16 ( = breviarium) totius imperii, id. Aug. 101 fin.:rationarium imperii,
id. ib. 28.—A sum, number (rare), Plaut. Trin. 2, 4, 11:3.nunc lenonum et scortorum plus est fere Quam olim muscarum est. Ea nimia est ratio,
id. Truc. 1, 1, 49:pro ratione pecuniae liberalius est Brutus tractatus quam Pompeius,
Cic. Att. 6, 3, 5; cf. II. B. 1. c. infra.—A business matter, transaction, business; also, a matter, affair, in gen. (a favorite word of Cicero):b.res rationesque eri Ballionis curo,
Plaut. Ps. 2, 2, 31:res rationesque vestrorum omnium,
id. Am. prol. 4:re ac ratione cum aliquo conjunctus,
Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 70, § 172:de tota illa ratione atque re Gallicana inter se multa communicare,
id. Quint. 4, 15:cum (Druides) in reliquis fere rebus, publicis privatisque rationibus, Graecis utantur litteris,
Caes. B. G. 6, 14 (metaphrast. pragmasi):ratio nummaria,
Cic. Att. 10, 11, 2:aeraria ratio,
id. Quint. 4, 15:ratio domestica... bellica,
id. Off. 1, 22, 76:quod ad popularem rationem attinet,
id. Fam. 1, 2, 4:rationes familiares componere,
Tac. A. 6, 16 fin.:fori judiciique rationem Messala suscepit,
Cic. Rosc. Am. 51, 149; cf.:in explicandis rationibus rerum civilium,
id. Rep. 1, 8, 13:rationes civitatis,
id. ib. 1, 6, 11:quantos aestus habet ratio comitiorum... nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum,
id. Mur. 17, 35:propter rationem Gallici belli,
id. Prov. Cons. 8, 19; so id. ib. 8, 14, 35:ad omnem rationem humanitatis,
id. Mur. 31, 66: in hac ratione quid res, quid causa, quid tempus ferat, tu facillime perspicies, id. Fam. 1, 7, 6 fin.:ad eam rationem existimabam satis aptam naturam meam,
id. Att. 9, 11, A, 1.—Pregn.: meae (tuae, etc.) rationes, my ( thy, etc.) interest, my ( thy, etc.) advantage (cf. in Engl. to find one's account in any thing):II.me ad ejus rationes adjungo, quem tu in meis rationibus tibi esse adjungendum putasti,
Cic. Fam. 1, 8, 2; cf.:exemplum meis alienissimum rationibus,
id. Corn. Fragm. 1, 7 B. and K.:consideres, quid tuae rationes postulent,
Sall. C. 44, 5: servitia repudiabat... alienum suis rationibus existimans videri causam civium cum servis fugitivis communicasse, inconsistent with his policy or interests, id. ib. 56, 5:si meas rationes unquam vestrae saluti anteposuissem,
Cic. Red. ad Quir. 1, 1.Trop., a reckoning, account, computation:B.postquam hanc rationem cordi ventrique edidi,
presented this reckoning, Plaut. Aul. 2, 7, 12:itidem hic ut Acheronti ratio accepti scribitur,
i.e. things are taken only, nothing is given back, id. Truc. 4, 2, 36:nomen (comoediae) jam habetis, nunc rationes ceteras Accipite,
an account of the rest, id. Poen. prol. 55; cf.:census quom sum, juratori recte rationem dedi,
id. Trin. 4, 2, 30; so,rationem dare, for the more usual rationem reddere,
Varr. L. L. 6, § 86 Mull.; Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 36, § 92 Zumpt:(argentarii) ratione utuntur,
make a reckoning, settle up, Plaut. Cas. prol. 27:cum eam mecum rationem puto,
go into that calculation, think over the matter, id. ib. 3, 2, 25; cf.:frustra egomet mecum has rationes puto,
Ter. Ad. 2, 1, 54:(Medea et Atreus) inita subductaque ratione nefaria scelera meditantes,
Cic. N. D. 3, 29, 71:quod posteaquam iste cognovit hanc rationem habere coepit,
to make the following calculation, reflection, id. Verr. 2, 5, 39, § 101; cf.: totius rei consilium his rationibus explicavit, ut si, etc.,... si, etc.,... sin, etc., drew the plan of the whole undertaking according to the following calculation, that if, etc., Caes. B. C. 3, 78;and herewith cf.: rationem consilii mei accipite,
id. ib. 3, 86:ut habere rationem possis, quo loco me convenias, etc.,
that you may calculate, Cic. Fam. 3, 6, 6:semper ita vivamus, ut rationem reddendam nobis arbitremur,
id. Verr. 2, 2, 11, § 28; cf.:nihil est, quod minus ferendum sit, quam rationem ab altero vitae reposcere eum, qui non possit suae reddere,
id. Div. in Caecil. 9, 28;and with this cf.: si gravius quid acciderit, abs te rationem reposcent,
will call you to account, Caes. B. G. 5, 30: clarorum virorum atque magnorum non minus otii, quam negotii rationem exstare oportere, an account must be capable of being given, Cato ap. Cic. Planc. 27, 66:tam otii quam negotii rationem reddere majores censuisse,
Col. 11 fin.: eam condicionem esse imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur, that the account is not correct unless, etc., Tac. A. 1, 6 fin.:mirum est quam singulis diebus in urbe ratio aut constet aut constare videatur,
Plin. Ep. 1, 9, 1; 1, 5, 16 et saep.; cf. Just. praef. 5.—Transf.1.Relation, reference, respect to a thing:b.(agricolae) habent rationem cum terra, quae nunquam recusat imperium,
have an account, have to do, have dealings with the earth, Cic. Sen. 15, 51; cf.:ubi ratio cum Orco habetur,
Varr. R. R. 1, 4, 3;for which: ubi sit cum Orco ratio ponenda,
Col. 1, 3, 2:cum omnibus Musis rationem habere cogito,
Cic. Att. 2, 5, 2:cum hac (muliere) aliquid adulescentem hominem habuisse rationis,
id. Cael. 20, 50; cf. id. Verr. 2, 2, 77, § 190. omnes, quibuscum ratio huic aut est aut fuit, assunt, defendunt, id. Quint. 23, 75; cf.. quae ratio tibi cum eo intercesserat?
id. Rosc. Com. 14, 41:pacis vero quae potest esse cum eo ratio, in quo est incredibilis crudelitas, fides nulla?
id. Phil. 4, 6, 14:quod si habenda cum M. Antonii latrocinio pacis ratio fuit, etc.,
id. ib. 12, 7, 17:fontes ad nostrorum annalium rationem veteres, ad ipsorum sane recentes,
in respect to our annals, id. Brut. 13, 49.—Pregn., a respect, regard, concern, consideration, care for a thing (usu. in the connection habere and ducere alicujus rei rationem): ad hanc rationem quoniam maximam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam: utriusque omnino habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, Cic. Off. 1, 33, 120:c.quorum (civium Romanorum) nobis pro vestra sapientia, Quirites, habenda est ratio diligenter,
id. Imp. Pomp. 7, 17:(deos) piorum et impiorum habere rationem,
id. Leg. 2, 7, 15:cujus absentis rationem haberi proximis comitiis populus jussisset,
Caes. B. C. 1, 9; so,absentis,
id. ib. 1, 32; 3, 82 fin.:sauciorum et aegrorum habita ratione,
id. ib. 3, 75:moneret, frumenti rationem esse habendam,
Hirt. B. G. 8, 34;so (al. frumentandi), rationem habere,
Caes. B. G. 7, 75 Oud.; cf. id. ib. 7, 71:alicujus vel dignitatis vel commodi rationem non habere,
Cic. de Or. 2, 4, 17: ut summae rei publicae rationem habeamus, Pompeius ap. Cic. Att. 8, 12, c, 3:alicujus salutis rationem habere,
i. e. to regard, care for, be concerned about, Caes. B. G. 7, 71; so id. B. C. 1, 20:turpissimae fugae rationem habere,
id. ib. 2, 31:ut in ceteris habenda ratio non sui solum sed etiam aliorum, sic, etc.,
Cic. Off. 1, 39, 139:proinde habeat rationem posteritatis et periculi sui,
Caes. B. C. 1, 13:habere nunc se rationem officii pro beneficiis Caesaris,
id. B. G. 5, 27:non ullius rationem sui commodi ducit,
Cic. Rosc. Am. 44, 128:cum hujusce periculi tum ceterorum quoque officiorum et amicitiarum ratio,
id. Clu. 42, 117:omnis hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, ut, etc.,
id. Lael. 24, 89; cf.:didici ex tuis litteris, te omnibus in rebus habuisse rationem, ut mihi consuleres,
id. Fam. 3, 5, 1:habeo rationem, quid a populo Romano acceperim,
bring into consideration, consider, id. Verr. 2, 5, 14, § 36:ut habere rationem possis, quo loco me salva lege Cornelia convenias, ego veni, etc.,
id. Fam. 3, 6, 6:neque illud rationis habuisti, eam provinciam ad summam stultitiam nequitiamque venisse,
id. Verr. 2, 5, 15, § 38; cf.:hoc rationis habebant, facere eos nullo modo posse, ut, etc.,
id. ib. 2, 2, 29, e70.—Relation to a thing, i. e.(α).Subject., course, conduct, procedure, mode, manner, method, fashion, plan, etc. (cf. consilium):(β).nunc sic rationem incipissam, hanc instituam astutiam, ut, etc.,
Plaut. Mil. 2, 2, 82; cf. id. ib. 3, 1, 175 sqq.:ubi cenas hodic, si hanc rationem instituis?
Plaut. Stich. 3, 1, 26; id. Truc. 1, 1, 3:tua ratio est, ut secundum binos ludos mihi respondere incipias: mea, ut ante primos ludos comperendinem. Ita fiet, ut tua ista ratio existimetur astuta, meum hoc consilium necessarium,
Cic. Verr. 1, 11, 34; cf.:ratio viaque defensionis,
id. Verr. 2, 5, 1, § 4:itaque in praesentia Pompeii insequendi rationem omittit,
Caes. B. C. 1, 30:mea autem ratio in dicendo haec esse solet, ut, etc.,
Cic. de Or. 2, 72, 292:haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi,
id. N. D. 1, 5, 11:dicendi,
id. Or. 32, 114; id. de Or. 3, 15, 56; cf.:aliquot ante annis inita ratio est, ut, etc.,
id. Rep. 2, 36, 61:ut, quo primum occurreretur, vix ratio iniri possit,
Caes. B. G. 7, 24:quia reponendarum (tegularum) nemo artifex inire rationem potuerit,
Liv. 42, 3 fin. —In plur.:hoc aditu laudis non mea me voluntas sed meae vitae rationes ab ineunte aetate susceptae prohibuerunt,
plan of life, Cic. Imp. Pomp. 1, 1:de rationibus rerum publicarum aut constituendarum aut tuendarum,
id. Rep. 1, 6, 11.—Object., relation, condition, nature, kind, sort, fashion, way, etc. (cf. modus):(γ).sed ratio ordoque agminis aliter se habebat ac Belgae ad Nervios detulerant,
Caes. B. G. 2, 19; cf.:ut rei militaris ratio atque ordo postulabat,
id. ib. 2, 22; so,rei militaris,
id. ib. 4, 23:ratio atque usus belli,
the art and practice of war, id. ib. 4, 1; id. B. C. 1, 76 fin.; 2, 18; 3, 17 et saep. al.; cf.:novae rationes bellandi,
id. ib. 3, 50:ratio equestris proelii,
id. B. G. 5, 16:quorum operum haec erat ratio, etc.,
id. B. C. 1, 25; cf.: rationem pontis hanc instituit;tigna bina, etc.,
id. B. G. 4, 17:serpit per omnium vitas amicitia, nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui,
Cic. Lael. 23, 87; cf.:ita ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut, etc.,
id. ib. 27, 101; id. Ac. 2, 43, 132:civitas (Platonis) non quae possit esse, sed in qua ratio rerum civilium perspici posset,
id. Rep. 2, 30, 52 init.; cf.:reliqui disseruerunt de generibus et de rationibus civitatum,
id. ib. 2, 11, 22;1, 8, 13: quam creberrimis litteris faciam ut tibi nota sit omnis ratio dierum atque itinerum meorum,
id. Fam. 3, 5, 4: quoniam eadem est ratio juris in utroque, id. Rep. 3, 12, 21; cf.:haec eadem ratio est in summa totius Galliae,
Caes. B. G. 6, 11 fin.:ab nostris eadem ratione, qua pridie, resistitur,
id. ib. 5, 40; id. B. C. 3, 100; cf. id. ib. 3, 101:docet, longe alia ratione esse bellum gerendum atque antea sit gestum,
id. B. G. 7, 14:hoc si Romae fieri posset, certe aliqua ratione expugnasset iste,
Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 52, ee130:quid refert, qua me ratione cogatis?
id. Lael. 8, 26:quod fuit illis conandum atque omni ratione efficiendum,
Caes. B. C. 1, 65 fin.; 1, 67 fin.:simili ratione Pompeius in suis castris consedit,
id. ib. 3, 76:auxilium ferri nulla ratione poterat,
id. ib. 1, 70:nec quibus rationibus superare possent, sed quem ad modum uti victoria deberent, cogitabant,
id. ib. 3, 83 fin.; 3, 58; 3, 18 fin. et saep.—With gen. of a subst. in circumlocution for the subst. itself (v. Zumpt, Gram. §2.678): vereor ne oratio mea aliena ab judiciorum ratione esse videatur,
Cic. Verr. 2, 4, 49, ee109:multa autem propter rationem brevitatis praetermittenda,
id. ib. 2, 1, 40, ee103: quantas perturbationes et quantos aestus habet ratio comitiorum?
id. Mur. 17, 35:nihil fallacius ratione tota comitiorum,
id. ib. 17, 36:praedicere tempestatum rationem et praedonum,
id. ib. 2, 4:tota ratio talium largitionum genere vitiosa est,
id. Off. 2, 17, 60.—Pregn., that faculty of the mind which forms the basis of computation and calculation, and hence of mental action in general, i. e. judgment, understanding, reason: duplex est vis animorum atque natura: una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est hormê Graece, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit;b.altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum, quid fugiendum sit. Ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet,
Cic. Off. 1, 28, 101:homo, quod rationis est particeps, per quam consequentia cernit, causas rerum videt earumque progressus et quasi antecessiones non ignorat, similitudines comparat rebusque praesentibus adjungit atque annectit futuras, facile totius vitae cursum videt ad eamque degendam praeparat res necessarias. Eademque natura vi rationis hominem concilia homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem, etc.,
id. ib. 1, 4, 11 sq.:haud scio, an melius fuerit, humano generi motum istum celerem cogitationis, acumen, sollertiam, quam rationem vocamus, non dari omnino quam tam munifice et tam large dari, etc.,
id. N. D. 2, 27, 69:lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quae jubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, lex est,
id. Leg. 1, 6, 18:ut, quos ratio non posset, eos ad officium religio duceret,
id. N. D. 1, 42, 118:mens et ratio et consilium in senibus est,
id. Sen. 19, 67; cf. Liv. 28, 28:si pudor quaeritur, si probitas, si fides, Mancinus haec attulit, si ratio, consilium, prudentia, Pompeius antistat,
Cic. Rep. 3, 18, 28; cf. id. Quint. 16, 53; and:si ratio et prudentia curas aufert,
Hor. Ep. 1, 11, 25:quibus in rebus temeritas et casus, non ratio nec consilium valet,
Cic. Div. 2, 41, 85; cf.:illa de urbis situ revoces ad rationem quae a Romulo casu aut necessitate facta sunt,
id. Rep. 2, 11, 22; and:moneo ut agentem te ratio ducat, non fortuna,
Liv. 22, 39 fin.: mulier abundat audacia;consilio et ratione deficitur,
Cic. Clu. 65, 184:Ariovistum magis ratione et consilio quam virtute vicisse. Cui rationi contra homines barbaros locus fuisset, etc.,
Caes. B. G. 1, 40: arma amens capio;nec sat rationis in armis,
Verg. A. 2, 314:rationis egens,
id. ib. 8, 299 et saep.:iracundia dissidens a ratione,
Cic. Rep. 1, 38, 60:majora quam hominum ratio consequi possit,
id. ib. 1, 10, 15:quantum ratione provideri poterat,
Caes. B. G. 7, 16 fin.:quantumque in ratione esset, exploratum habuit,
Hirt. B. G. 8, 6 init.:nec majore ratione bellum administrari posse,
Caes. B. C. 7, 21:minari divisoribus ratio non erat,
it was not reasonable, was contrary to reason, Cic. Verr. 1, 9, 24; so, nulla ratio est, with an objectclause, id. Caecin. 5, 15; so,too, minime rationis est,
Col. 3, 5, 3; cf. with dat.:Vitellianus exercitus, cui acquiescere Cremonae ratio fuit,
which, as reason dictated, ought to have rested at Cremona, Tac. H. 3, 22:quod domi te inclusisti, ratione fecisti,
reasonably, sensibly, judiciously, Cic. Att. 12, [p. 1527] 14, 3.—The reasonable cause of a thing, a ground, motive, reason:(β).ratio est causa, quae demonstrat, verum esse id, quod intendimus, brevi subjectione. Rationis confirmatio est ea, quae pluribus argumentis corroborat breviter expositam rationem,
Auct. Her. 2, 18, 28:quid tandem habuit argumenti aut rationis res, quamobrem, etc.,
Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 47, § 115; cf.:nostra confirmare argumentis ac rationibus: deinde contraria refutare,
id. de Or. 2, 19, 80:noverit orator argumentorum et rationum locos,
id. Or. 14, 44 (v. also argumentum):si mei consilii causam rationemque cognoverit,
id. Div. in Caecil. 1, 1; cf.:ad eam sententiam cum reliquis causis haec quoque ratio eos deduxit, quod, etc.,
Caes. B. G. 2, 10 fin.:quam habet rationem, non quaero aequitatis, sed ipsius improbitatis atque impudentiae?... facti, si non bonam, at aliquam rationem afferre,
Cic. Verr. 2, 3, 85, e196; cf.:deinde nihil rationis affert, quamobrem, etc.,
id. Caecin. 33, 96:non deest hoc loco copia rationum, quibus docere velitis, humanas esse formas deorum: primum quod, etc.... deinde quod, etc.... tertiam rationem affertis, quod, etc.,
id. N. D. 1, 27, 76:et quidem, cur sic opinetur, rationem subicit,
id. Div. 2, 50, 104:idcirco minus existimo te nihil nisi summa ratione fecisse,
id. Att. 8, 11, D, §5: nunc non modo agendi rationem nullam habeo, sed ne cogitandi quidem,
id. Fam. 4, 13, 3:rationes in ea disputatione a te collectae vetabant me rei publicae penitus diffidere,
id. Fam. 5, 13, 3; cf. id. Ac. 2, 36, 116:rationibus conquisitis de voluptate et dolore disputandum putant,
id. Fin. 1, 9, 31; cf.:quod cum disputando rationibusque docuisset,
id. Rep. 1, 16, 25:his rationibus tam certis tamque illustribus opponuntur ab his, qui contra disputant primum labores, etc.,
id. ib. 1, 3, 4 et saep.:num parva causa aut prava ratio est?
reason, excuse, Ter. Eun. 3, 5, 27.—In rhet., a showing cause, argument, reasoning in support of a proposition:c.ratio est, quae continet causam, quae si sublata sit, nihil in causa controversiae relinquatur, hoc modo: Orestes si accusetur matricidii, nisi hoc dicat, Jure feci, illa enim patrem meum occiderat, non habet defensionem,
Cic. Inv. 1, 13, 18:ad propositum subjecta ratio, et item in distributis supposita ratio,
id. de Or. 3, 54, 207; cf. Quint. 3, 11, 4; 5, 14, 1; 16; 7, 8, 3.—Reasonableness, reason, propriety, law, rule, order, conformity, etc.:d.in omnibus, quae ratione docentur et via, primum constituendum est, quid quidque sit, etc.,
in a reasonable, regular manner, Cic. Or. 33, 116; cf.:ut ratione et via procedat oratio,
id. Fin. 1, 9, 29:modo et ratione aliquid facere (along with recte atque ordine facere),
id. Quint. 7, 28; cf.:quae res Nec modum habet neque consilium, ratione modoque Tractari non vult,
Hor. S. 2, 3, 266:nihil est, quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio,
Cic. N. D. 2, 16, 43:intervallis imparibus, sed tamen pro rata parte ratione distinctis,
divided proportionally by rule, id. Rep. 6, 18, 18; cf.:ex summis et infimis et mediis interjectis ordinibus ut sonis moderata ratione civitas concinit,
in symmetrical proportion, id. ib. 2, 42, 69:in quo defuit fortasse ratio, sed tamen vincit ipsa rerum publicarum natura saepe rationem,
order, system, id. ib. 2, 33, 57;5, 5, 7: declinatio si cum ratione fiet,
reasonably, id. Tusc. 4, 6, 13:ratio et distributio,
a reasonable division, Q. Cic. Pet. Cons. 1, 1.—A theory, doctrine, or system based upon reason; science, and (less freq.), subject., knowledge:e.erat enim tunc haec nova et ignota ratio, solem lunae oppositum solere deficere,
Cic. Rep. 1, 16, 25; cf.:nova et a nobis inventa ratio,
id. ib. 1, 8, 13;2, 39, 66: si animum contulisti in istam rationem et quasi artem,
id. ib. 1, 23, 37; cf.:omnes tacito quodam sensu sine ulla arte aut ratione, quae sint in artibus ac rationibus recta ac prava dijudicant,
id. de Or. 3, 50, 195; id. Brut. 74, 258:continet enim totam hanc quaestionem ea ratio, quae est de natura deorum,
id. Div. 1, 51, 117:Epicuri ratio, quae plerisque notissima est,
doctrine, system, philosophy, id. Fin. 1, 5, 13; cf.:Stoicorum ratio disciplinaque,
id. Off. 3, 4, 20:Cynicorum ratio,
id. ib. 1, 41, 148; so id. Fin. 3, 20, 68: ratio vivendi... ratio civilis et disciplina populorum, the art of living... statesmanship, id. Rep. 3, 3, 4; cf.:etiamsi cui videbitur illa in optimis studiis et artibus quieta vitae ratio beatior, haec civilis laudabilior est certe et illustrior,
id. ib. 3, 3, 4:improba navigii ratio tum caeca jacebat,
Lucr. 5, 1004: saltationis ac musicae rationis studiosi, Col. prooem. e3 al.—Subject., knowledge:si qua (est in me) exercitatio dicendi aut si hujus rei ratio aliqua, ab optimarum artium studiis ac disciplina profecta,
Cic. Arch. 1, 1.—A view or opinion resting upon reasonable grounds:f.mea sic est ratio,
Ter. Ad. 1, 1, 43; cf.:inventus est nemo, cujus non haec et sententia esset et oratio, non esse metuendum, etc.... Haec cum omnes sentirent et cum in eam rationem pro suo quisque sensu ac dolore loqueretur,
Cic. Verr. 2, 1, 27, § 68 sq.; and with this cf. id. Att. 1, 11, 1:cujus ratio etsi non valuit,
Nep. Milt. 3, 6 (just before: hujus cum sententiam plurimi essent secuti).—In philos. lang., a production of proof, argumentation, reasoning: (Epicurus) tollit definitiones; nihil de dividendo ac partiendo docet;non, quo modo efficiatur concludaturque ratio, tradit,
Cic. Fin. 1, 7, 22; cf. id. Div. 2, 10, 25; id. de Or. 2, 38, 158:ratio ipsa coget, et ex aeternitate quaedam esse vera et ea non esse nexa causis aeternis, etc.,
id. Fat. 16, 38; cf.:ergo, ubi tyrannus est, ibi non vitiosam ut heri dicebam, sed, ut nunc ratio cogit, dicendum est, plane nullam esse rem publicam,
id. Rep. 3, 31, 43. -
13 coherencia
f.1 consistency.2 coherence, cohesion, coherency, cogency.* * *1 coherence, coherency* * *noun f.* * *SF1) [de ideas, razonamiento, exposición] coherence2) [de acciones, proyecto, política] consistency3) (Fís) cohesion* * *1)a) ( congruencia) coherence, logiccon coherencia — coherently o logically
b) ( consecuencia) consistencyqué falta de coherencia! — he's/it's so inconsistent
* * *= coherence, congruence, consistency, unity, congruency.Ex. At the same time outdated terminology adds to the lack of coherence.Ex. Also in 1972, John Christ, in his 'Concepts and Subject Headings', concluded that there was a lack of congruence between social science terminology and the LC subject headings for materials in the social sciences.Ex. Absence of human interpretation of content leads to perfect predictability and consistency in the generation of index entries.Ex. The part chosen should have a unity of its own, a wholeness that offers a complete experience without at the same time giving away everything.Ex. The author offers solutions to achieving greater congruency between theory, managerial intentions and staff experiences through a humane approach to management.----* coherencia editorial = editorial continuity.* mantener la coherencia = maintain + consistency.* tener coherencia = cohere.* * *1)a) ( congruencia) coherence, logiccon coherencia — coherently o logically
b) ( consecuencia) consistencyqué falta de coherencia! — he's/it's so inconsistent
* * *= coherence, congruence, consistency, unity, congruency.Ex: At the same time outdated terminology adds to the lack of coherence.
Ex: Also in 1972, John Christ, in his 'Concepts and Subject Headings', concluded that there was a lack of congruence between social science terminology and the LC subject headings for materials in the social sciences.Ex: Absence of human interpretation of content leads to perfect predictability and consistency in the generation of index entries.Ex: The part chosen should have a unity of its own, a wholeness that offers a complete experience without at the same time giving away everything.Ex: The author offers solutions to achieving greater congruency between theory, managerial intentions and staff experiences through a humane approach to management.* coherencia editorial = editorial continuity.* mantener la coherencia = maintain + consistency.* tener coherencia = cohere.* * *A1 (congruencia) coherence, logicexpuso sus ideas con coherencia she expressed her ideas coherently o logically2 (consecuencia) consistencyhay que actuar con coherencia you have to be consistentla falta de coherencia entre lo que predican y lo que hacen the lack of consistency between what they preach and what they doB ( Fís) coherence* * *
coherencia sustantivo femenino
◊ con coherencia coherently o logically
c) (Fís) coherence
coherencia sustantivo femenino coherence, consistency: la coherencia de sus argumentos era aplastante, his reasoning was extremely coherent
' coherencia' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
consecuencia
- inconsistente
English:
consistency
* * *coherencia nf1. [de conducta, estilo] consistency;actuar con coherencia to be consistent;en coherencia con su postura, se negó a utilizar la violencia in accordance with his position, he refused to use violence2. [de razonamiento] coherence;falta de coherencia lack of coherence3. Fís cohesion* * *f coherence* * *coherencia nf: coherence♦ coherente adj -
14 རིག་པ་
[rig pa](pure, sheer) presence, know, knower, knowledge, understand, actually experience, (immediate, pure, intrinsic, aesthetic, value-sustained, -) awareness, noetic act, pure sensation, information input, cognition, cognitive (capacity, being), energetic charge, intrinsic perception, science, -> rtogs pa'i rig pa, the flash of knowing that gives awareness its illumining quality, insight, logic, mantra, talent, wit, science, learning, literature, intellectual reasoning -
15 artificial intelligence
Gen Mgta branch of computer science concerned with the development of computer systems capable of performing functions that normally require human intelligence, for example, reasoning, problem solving, learning from experience, and speech recognition. Artificial intelligence research combines elements of computer science and cognitive psychology. It is a controversial field because of the difficulty of defining its goals and disagreement over whether these goals are attainable. Much research has been done since World War II, beginning with the theoretical work of Alan Turing during the 1940s. The term became known with the publication in 1961 of the paper Steps Toward Artificial Intelligence by Marvin Minsky, cofounder with John McCarthy of the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Branches of artificial intelligence with applications in business and management include expert systems and robotics. -
16 defence
dɪˈfens сущ.;
тж. defense
1) а) защита to speak out in defence of justice ≈ высказываться в защиту справедливости best defence is offence ≈ лучшая защита - это нападение Syn: protection, justification, vindication б) оборона to conduct a defence, organize a defence, put up a defence ≈ оборонять, защищать to overwhelm smb.'s defences ≈ прорывать оборону line of defence ≈ линия обороны heroic defence ≈ героическая защита inadequate defence, weak defence ≈ слабая защита stubborn defence ≈ упорная защита the defence of our country ≈ защита нашей страны They are to take measures for the defence of the country. ≈ Они должны принять меры для обороны страны. в) псих. защитная реакция defence mechanism ≈ защитный механизм The faith of modern Germany is, in psychological language, a 'defence' against reasoning. ≈ Вера в современной Германии это, на языке психологии, 'защитная реакция' против разума. г) спорт защита man-to-man defence ≈ индивидуальная защита zone defence ≈ защита зоны
2) а) защитные средства, то, что защищает, предохраняет Mountains are necessary as a defence against the violence of heat, in the warm latitudes. ≈ Горы необходимы как средство защиты против безумной жары в жарких широтах. airtight defence, impenetrable defence ≈ герметическая защита, непроницаемая б) мн.;
воен. укрепления, оборонительные сооружения military defences ≈ военные укрепления
3) юр. защита а) сторона, защищающая на суде обвиняемого б) часть судебного разбирательства, проводимого защитой a legal defence ≈ судебная защита the defence rests ≈ защита отдыхает защита - missile * противоракетная защита - * mechanism защитный механизм - a thick overcoat is a good * against cold теплое пальто хорошо предохраняет от холода - in * of peace в защиту мира - to die in * of liberty пасть в борьбе за свободу оборона - national * национальная оборона;
оборона страны - last-ditch * последнее отчаянное сопротивление - all-round * круговая оборона - active * активная оборона - civil * гражданская оборона - air * противовоздушная оборона - heavy * плотная оборона - territorial * территориальная оборона - * tactics оборонительная тактика - * expenditure расходы на оборону - D. Board совет обороны - the Ministry of D. министерство обороны - line of * полоса обороны;
оборонительный рубеж - first line of * (образное) "первая линия обороны", военно-морской флот( Великобритании) - second line of * (образное) "вторая линия обороны", армия( Великобритании) - to fix /to establish/ a line of * построить линию обороны - weapons of * оборонительное оружие - the system of collective * система коллективной безопасности - * in depth( военное) эшелонированная оборона - * in place( военное) стабильная оборона - to rise to the * of one's nation подняться на защиту своего народа - to make a good * against the enemy успешно отбивать атаки противника - best * is offence нападение -лучшая защита оправдание, защита - in * в защиту, в оправдание - in one's * в свою защиту - to speak in * of smb. выступать в чью-л. защиту, заступаться за кого-л. - it may be said in his * that... в его оправдание можно сказать, что... - to make no * against accusations ничего не сказать в свою защиту pl (военное) укрепления, оборонительные сооружения;
система, средства обороны - coast *s береговые укрепления - to set up *s организовывать оборону, строить оборонительные сооружения (юридическое) защита (тж. как сторона на процессе) - the case for the * защита - the counsel for the * защитник обвиняемого - to conduct one's own * отказаться от защитника, взять на себя защиту, защищаться самому речь защитника письменное возражение ответчика против иска( спортивное) защита - Indian * (шахматное) индийская защита - man-to-man * защита "игрок против игрока" - team * командная защита > the science /art/ of * бокс affirmative ~ заявление о фактах, опровергающих риск ~ запрещение( рыбной ловли) ;
best defence is offence нападение - лучший вид защиты ~ юр. защита (на суде) ;
оправдание, реабилитация;
counsel for the defence защитник обвиняемого defence адвокат ~ аргументация ответчика ~ возражение по иску ~ запрещение (рыбной ловли) ;
best defence is offence нападение - лучший вид защиты ~ запрещение ~ спорт. защита ~ юр. защита (на суде) ;
оправдание, реабилитация;
counsel for the defence защитник обвиняемого ~ защита (на суде), аргументация ответчика, возражение по иску, возражение ответчика ~ защита ~ защита на суде ~ оборона;
защита ~ оборона, защита ~ оборона ~ письменное возражение ответчика против иска ~ речь защитника ~ pl воен. укрепления, оборонительные сооружения defense: defense амер. = defence ~ of nonpayment оправдание неплатежа gas ~ противохимическая оборона naval ~ военно-морская оборона Pac-Man ~ орг.бизн. стратегия "Пэк Мэн" (защита от поглощения путем попытки поглотить компанию-агрессора) personal ~ личная защита procedural ~ процессуальная защита -
17 legal
1) законна дія2) законний, легальний; заснований на законі; заснований на загальному праві, який регулюється загальним правом; легітимний; правовий; правознавчий; правомірний; правосудний; судовий; узаконений; юридичний•legal and administrative machinery for family support — правові і адміністративні заходи підтримки сім'ї
legal gap in protection afforded — прогалина у правовому захисті, що надається
- legal abortionlegal power to correct legal errors — надане законом право виправляти юридичні ( або судові) помилки
- legal abuse
- legal access
- legal accountability
- legal acquisition
- legal act
- legal action
- legal activities
- legal activities activity
- legal acts
- legal address
- legal administration
- legal advertisement
- legal advice
- legal advice bureau
- legal advice center
- legal advice centre
- legal advice office
- legal adviser
- legal advisor
- legal age
- legal agency
- legal agent
- legal aid
- legal aid agency
- legal aid bureau
- legal aid office
- legal aid order
- legal alien
- legal analogy
- legal analysis
- legal approach
- legal area
- legal argument
- legal arrest
- legal aspect
- legal assets
- legal assignment
- legal assistance
- legal assistant
- legal assumption
- legal author
- legal autonomy
- legal awareness
- legal bar
- legal barrier
- legal basis
- legal bill
- legal body
- legal bond
- legal boundary
- legal burden
- legal business
- legal cadres
- legal calendar
- legal capacity
- legal capital
- legal career
- legal case
- legal category
- legal cause
- legal certainty
- legal challenge
- legal changes
- legal charge
- legal check
- legal cheque
- legal circumstance
- legal citation
- legal claim
- legal closing time
- legal code
- legal coercion
- legal committee
- legal competence
- legal complexity
- legal concept
- legal condition
- legal confinement
- legal conflict
- legal conscience
- legal consequence
- legal consequences
- legal consideration
- legal construction
- legal consultation
- legal context
- legal continuity
- legal control
- legal controversy
- legal conviction
- legal-correctional process
- legal costs
- legal councilor
- legal councillor
- legal counsel
- legal counseling
- legal counselor
- legal counsellor
- legal crackdown
- legal crime
- legal culture
- legal currency
- legal custody
- legal custom
- legal decision
- legal deduction
- legal defect
- legal defence
- legal defense
- legal deficiency
- legal definition
- legal delinquency
- legal delivery
- legal demand
- legal deontology
- legal department
- legal dependence
- legal deposit copy
- legal deposit library
- legal descent
- legal details
- legal detention
- legal device
- legal difference
- legal disability
- legal disadvantage
- legal discretion
- legal discrimination
- legal dispute
- legal doctrine
- legal document
- legal documentation
- legal drinking
- legal drinking age
- legal drinking limit
- legal drug
- legal duty
- legal duty
- legal eagle
- legal eavesdropping
- legal education
- legal effect
- legal effectiveness
- legal efficacy
- legal enforcement
- legal enforcement of law
- legal enforcement procedure
- legal entity under public law
- legal entity
- legal environment
- legal equality
- legal equality of the sexes
- legal error
- legal essence
- legal estate
- legal ethics
- legal evaluation
- legal evidence
- legal excuse
- legal execution
- legal executive
- legal exemption
- legal expenses
- legal expenses insurance
- legal experience
- legal expert
- legal expertise
- legal explanation
- legal exposition
- legal fact
- legal father
- legal fees
- legal fetishism
- legal fiction
- legal field
- legal fight
- legal force
- legal form
- legal formality
- legal formula
- legal formulation
- legal foundation
- legal foundations
- legal frame
- legal framework
- legal framing
- legal fraud
- legal function
- legal gambler
- legal gambling
- legal gap
- legal glossator
- legal government
- legal ground
- legal groundwork
- legal guarantee
- legal guarantees
- legal guardian
- legal guilt
- legal hearing
- legal historian
- legal history
- legal holder
- legal holiday
- legal home
- legal humanism
- legal hypothesis
- legal identity
- legal immigration
- legal immunity
- legal implementation
- legal implication
- legal implications
- legal impossibility
- legal incapacity
- legal incident
- legal income
- legal incompetence
- legal information
- legal injury
- legal innovation
- legal innovation
- legal innovations
- legal insanity
- legal institution
- legal instruction
- legal instrument
- legal intent
- legal interest
- legal interest rate
- legal interpretation
- legal investigation
- legal investigator
- legal irregularity
- legal issue
- legal journal
- legal judge
- legal judgement
- legal judgment
- legal jurisdiction
- legal justice
- legal justification
- legal killer
- legal killing
- legal knowledge
- legal language
- legal liability
- legal lien
- legal limit
- legal limitation
- legal literature
- legal loophole
- legal lynching
- legal malice
- legal malpractice
- legal manufacture
- legal marriage
- legal matter
- legal maxim
- legal means
- legal means of social control
- legal measure
- legal mechanism
- legal medicine
- legal methodology
- legal minimum age of marriage
- legal minimum wage rate
- legal minimum wage rates
- legal minor
- legal monopoly
- legal monument
- legal mortgage
- legal mother
- legal name
- legal nationality
- legal negligence
- legal nihilism
- legal nomenclature
- legal norm
- legal notice
- legal notification
- legal notion
- legal object
- legal objection
- legal objective
- legal obligation
- legal observation method
- legal observer
- legal obstruction
- legal office
- legal office
- legal officer
- legal official
- legal operation
- legal opinion
- legal order
- legal organization
- legal owner
- legal parlance
- legal papers
- legal participation
- legal perjury
- legal permissibility
- legal permission
- legal person
- legal personality
- legal phenomenon
- legal philosopher
- legal philosophy
- legal picketing
- legal platform
- legal play
- legal point
- legal point of view
- legal policy
- legal portion
- legal position
- legal positivism
- legal positivist
- legal possession
- legal power
- legal practice
- legal practitician
- legal practitioner
- legal precept
- legal predecessor
- legal prerequisite
- legal presumption
- legal presumption of death
- legal principle
- legal privilege
- legal problem
- legal procedure
- legal procedure publicity
- legal procedures
- legal proceeding
- legal proceedings
- legal process
- legal profession
- legal profession member
- legal professional
- legal professional privilege
- legal prohibition
- legal proposition
- legal propriety
- legal prosecution
- legal protectee
- legal protection
- legal protection of software
- legal provision
- legal psychiatry
- legal purism
- legal purist
- legal qualification
- legal question
- legal rationale
- legal realism
- legal reality
- legal reasoning
- legal recognition
- legal recourse
- legal redress
- legal reference
- legal reform
- legal reformer
- legal regime
- legal regulation
- legal rehabilitation
- legal rehabilitation
- legal relations
- legal relationship
- legal relationships
- legal relative
- legal relativism
- legal relevance
- legal relief
- legal remedy
- legal representation
- legal representative
- legal reputation
- legal requirement
- legal reservation
- legal reserve
- legal residence
- legal resolution
- legal restraint
- legal restriction
- legal right-enforcing
- legal right
- legal rights
- legal risk
- legal rule
- legal safeguard
- legal safety
- legal sanction
- legal scholar
- legal science
- legal scientist
- legal search
- legal secretary
- legal security
- legal self-help
- legal sense
- legal sentence
- legal sentencing
- legal separation
- legal service
- legal services
- legal significance
- legal source
- legal specialist
- legal speech
- legal sphere
- legal spokesman
- legal spouse
- legal staff
- legal standard
- legal state
- legal statement
- legal statistics
- legal status
- legal status of a person
- legal step
- legal storage period
- legal strike
- legal structure
- legal studies
- legal subbranch
- legal sub-branch
- legal subject
- legal subjectivity
- legal submission
- legal subrogation
- legal succession
- legal successor
- legal suit
- legal system
- legal tapping
- legal technicality
- legal technician
- legal technique
- legal techniques
- legal tender
- legal tender note
- legal term
- legal termination
- legal termination of marriage
- legal territory
- legal test
- legal text
- legal theorist
- legal theory
- legal thinker
- legal thinking
- legal thought
- legal title
- legal tool
- legal topic
- legal tradition
- legal training
- legal transaction
- legal treasury note
- legal treatise
- legal treatment
- legal trial
- legal ubiquity
- legal uncertainty
- legal unit
- legal usage
- legal vacuum
- legal validity
- legal venue
- legal view
- legal viewpoint
- legal violence
- legal volition
- legal voter
- legal waiver
- legal wife
- legal wiretap
- legal wiretapping
- legal wording
- legal work
- legal writer
- legal writing
- legal wrong
- legal year -
18 युक्तिः _yuktiḥ
युक्तिः f. [युज्-क्तिन्]1 Union, junction, combination.-2 Application, use, employment.-3 Yoking, harnessing.-4 A practice, usage.-5 A means, an expedient, a plan, scheme.-6 A contrivance, device, trick.-7 Propriety, fitness, adjustment, aptness, suitableness.-8 Skill, art.-9 Reasoning, arguing, an argument.-1 Inference, deduction.-11 Reason, ground.-12 Arrangement (रचना); यत्र खल्वियं वाचोयुक्तिः Māl.1.-13 (In law) Probability, enumeration or specifica- tion of circumstances, such as time, place &c.; युक्तिप्राप्ति- क्रियाचिह्नसंबन्धाभोगहेतुभिः Y.2.92,212.-14 (In dramas) The regular chain or connection of events; cf. S. D. 343.-15 (In Rhet.) Emblematical or covert expres- sion of one's purpose or design.-16 Sum, total.-17 Alloying of metal.-18 Charm, spell.-19 (In gram.) A sentence.-2 (In astr.) A conjunction. (-युक्त्या ind.1 by means or virtue of.-2 cleverly, skilfully.-3 pro- perly, fitly, duly).-Comp. -कथनम् statement of reasons.-कर a.1 suitable, fit.-2 proved.-ज्ञ a. skil- led in expedients, inventive.-युक्त a.1 suitable, fit-2 expert, skilful.-3 established, proved.-4 argu- mentative.-शास्त्रम् the science of what is suitable. -
19 논리학
n. logic, science of inference and reasoning -
20 རྒྱུའི་རིག་
[rgyu'i rig]science of reasoning
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